Summary. Poovendran, Corson and Baras presented a distributed cryptographic key generation algorithm that was suitable for wireless networking environment. However, the security as well as the computational complexity of their scheme were never analyzed. In this work, we present information theoretic analysis of their work and derive the properties of the cryptographic keys that are generated by their scheme. We also present efficient computational schemes that would require only logarithmic number of steps in group size to compute the common keys.
Introduction
Broadcast is the inherent mode of communication in wireless networks that deploy omnidirectional antennas. In broadcast mode, all members who are within the communication range of the transmitting node can receive the message, thus making it resource-efficient for the sender as well as the network. However, in many applications the set of users that have access to the communication must be restricted. The use of cryptography is one way to restrict the set of members who can access the communication. When the amount of data is high, the use of symmetric keys will help reduce the computational overhead due to the encryption and decryption. However, the use of symmetric keys require that all members share the same keys for decryption. Several methods have been proposed to generate and distribute a single common key to all the members of a communicating group. Among these methods is the distributed key generation method proposed by Poovendran, Corson and Baras in [PCB] ,which we call the PCB scheme in this paper. The PCB scheme made use of modulo arithmetic and generalized the property of one-time pad, proposed by Shannon [CS] . However, as of now there is no analysis on the security properties of the PCB method. In this work we enhance the original PCB algorithm and present the security analysis based on infor-mation theoretic techniques. We also show how to develop a computationally efficient algorithm for computing the PCB keys.
The organization of the chapter is as follows: we first review the one-time pad and its properties using probabilistic as well as information theoretic approaches. We then present the PCB algorithm. We provide detailed analysis of the PCB algorithm using probabilistic as well as information theoretic techniques. We also show how to develop computationally efficient techniques that will enable efficient calculation of the group's shared key.
Properties of the One-time Pad based Encryption
We use the notations in [DS] to define a cryptosystem. A cryptographic system is a pentuple P, C, K, E, D, where the following conditions are satisfied:
1. P is a finite set of possible messages or plaintexts. 2. C is a finite set of possible encrypted messages or ciphertexts. 3. K is the finite set of keys or the keyspace. 4. E K is the encryption rule for a given key K. We denote E K : P → C. 5. D K is the decryption rule for a given key K. We denote D K : C → P.
One-time Pad Cryptosystem
Let p be a large prime. The plaintext and the encryption key are of the same length and chosen independently and are assumed to be picked uniformly in the interval [0, p − 1]. The encryption rule is the modulo addition w.r.t. p. The one-time pad scheme is given below:
If it can be shown that the ciphertext Y is independent of the encryption key or plaintext X, then observing the ciphertext Y reveals no information about the plaintext X, and hence the mutual information ( [CT] 
The main idea behind the one-time pad based encryption is stated in the following theorem: Theorem 1. Let p be a large prime number, A, B be two random variables that are mutually independent and uniformly distributed over the interval [0, p − 1]. Let C = A + B mod p. Then the random variable C is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, p − 1], and the random variables A, B, C are mutually independent.
Proof:: We compute the distribution of C using
Hence, C is uniformly distributed over the range [0, p − 1]. We now show that C is independent of A, B.
Hence, C is not only uniformly distributed in the interval [0, p − 1], but also independent of A (as well as B).
A direct consequence of these derivations is the fact that the random variable C is uncorrelated to random variable A or B. Hence, observing random variable C provides no information ( [CT] ) about random variables A or B. This idea can be expressed in terms of the mutual information between random variables C and A as:
Noting that P AC = P A P C , since A is independent of C, we find that log 
Review of the PCB Scheme
The PCB scheme presented in [PCB] can be viewed as a generalized version of one-time pad encryption. The PCB scheme consists of a Trusted Third Party based initialization step followed by distributed key generation step. We first define relevant notations. Let E Ki (m) denote the encryption of message m with key K i , and A → B : m to denote a message m sent from entity A to entity B. The PCB scheme is described below.
Initialization
In the initializaiton step, a Trusted Third Party (TTP) selects n participants of the distributed key generation scheme labeled
. It is assumed that the TTP shares a pairwise key K i with member M i of the group. The TTP chooses a large prime p, generates n uniformly distributed and independent random variables denoted α i,0 , with i = 1, · · · , n. The TTP computes
The TTP initializes each entity M i using the following message transfer
Broadcast Enhanced Distributed Key Generation
The distributed key generation consists of two stages. In the first stage each node generates its contribution, and secures and transmits it. In the second stage, each node collects contributions of all other nodes and combines them to generate the group key and its future onetime pad. The original PCB scheme in [PCB] assumed pairwise links between nodes. This procedure is computationally intensive and can be avoided in wireless broadcast environments. We also note that in the original PCB scheme there was no mechanism to make the participants commit to the shares they would contribute to the group key generation. Lack of comittment makes the original PCB scheme vulnerable to attacks by participants who can bias the final outcome. While we do not elaborate on the key space bias in this work, we eliminate it using a committment. These two changes are reflected in steps 4 and 5 of the algorithm presented below. At the iteration step j, a participant M i performs the following operations to generate its share of the distributed key:
A participant M i then combines the shares to compute the group key and the fresh one-time pad for its computations. A participant M i performs the following operations: 
4.
The PCB scheme is represented in a schematic diagram given below: 
Security Analysis of the PCB Scheme
As noted earlier, the PCB paper did not provide analysis of the scheme. We provide the security analysis of the PCB scheme in this section. We make the following claims about the security of the PCB scheme: Theorem 2. If random variables α i,0 are mutually independent and uniformly distributed in the interval [0, p − 1], then the group key θ 0 , defined by:
is uniform in the interval [0, p − 1] and is mutually independent with respect to any subset consisting of (n − 1) of the random variables α i,0 ; i = 1, · · · , n. Proof: We first show that θ 0 is uniformly distributed and then show that θ 0 is mutually independent of any set of (n-1) α i,0 . We prove that θ 0 is uniformly distributed using induction. Let U i = U i−1 + α i,0 with U 0 = 0. Then U 1 = α 1,0 ; U 2 = α 1,0 + α 2,0 ; · · · U n = θ 0 . We now show that U i ; i = 0, 1, · · · n are uniformly distributed. Note that for i = 1, U 1 = α 1,0 is by definition of α 1,0 is uniform over the interval [0, p − 1]. For i = 2, we have
(ii)
The step (i) follows from the definition of U 2 and the step (ii) follows from the observation that under modulo arithmetic as the summation includes all the p terms, even if there is an index shift. Hence, U 2 is uniformly distributed. Now we show that U 2 is independent of α 1,2 .
The step (i) follows from the fact that α 2,0 is independent of α 1,0 . Hence, U 2 is independent of U 1 ; however U 2 = α 2,0 + α 1,0 and U 1 = α 1,0 . Since α 1,0 and α 2,0 are mutually independent, interchanging them does not change the result; hence, 2 l=1 α l,0 is independent of α 1,0 as well as α 2,0 . Having illustrated the proof for two variables, lets prove the result for the case that i = n, when θ 0 = U n . We first prove that θ 0 is uniformly distributed and then show it is independent of any subset of (n − 1) α s. For simplicity, we define the notation that
Hence, we note that θ 0 is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, p − 1]. We now show that θ 0 is independent of any subset of (n − 1) α s.
The step (i) uses the mutual independent property of the α s. Note that the order of picking the α s was random. Hence, θ 0 is independent of any arbitrary subset consisting (n − 1) α s. We now state the following property of the PCB scheme as a theorem. Theorem 3. If random variables F K i,j are mutually independent and uniformly distributed in the interval [0, p − 1], θ j+1 , defined by
is uniform in the interval [0, p − 1] and is mutually independent with respect to any subset consisting of (n − 1) of the random variables F K i,0 ; i = 1, · · · , n.
Proof: Follows the similar inductive argument as above with α i,0 replaced with F K i,j and θ 0 replaced with θ j .
The above theorems show that observing any (n − 1) fractional keys does not reveal any information about the group key. Hence, an adversary needs to know all n fractional keys to compute the group key θ at any iteration. In terms of the mutual information, we can write
where the subset of (n − 1) fractional keys are chosen arbitrarily. Theorem 4. The intermediate pads α i,j , computed using the formula
The step (i) follows from the fact that all F K i,j s are mutually independent, and hence F K l,j is independent of the sum of Proof: We first show that I(θ j ∧ θ m ) = 0 for any arbitrary j, m.
The step (i) follows from the fact that given random variables
For clarity, we use the following notations:
In order to prove the general case considering the mutual information between a given θ j and a set S = {θ i 1 , θ i 2 , · · · , θ i m } where θ j ∈ S. We claim that
Proof: The proof is similar to the case above but will be presented for completeness.
= 0.
Again, the step (i) follows from the fact that given random variables
Extensions and Complexity
Not all wireless can be represented by a pure broadcast model. Many networks use multi-hop communications as well as directional antennas. The impact of directional antennas and multi-hop communications changes the communication complexity of distributed key generation for some algorithms more than others.
In this section we describe alternative PCB algorithms better tailored for some non-broadcast wireless networks. These alternative algorithms are motivated by point-to-point communications in wireless network. A point-to-point model corresponds to scenarios such as a group of widely distributed members communicating using cell phones, or a localized group communicating using pencil beam directional antennas.
We explore three alternative algorithms for distributed key generation based on hypercube, octopus, and tree structures. We then analyze the communication complexity of the original PCB algorithm, broadcast-enhanced PCB and the alternative algorithms. Our analysis has shown that for the point-to-point network, these alternative algorithms have lower communication complexity than either the original or broadcast-enhanced versions of the PCB algorithm. The broadcast-enhanced PCB algorithm has lower complexity than any other algorithm in a pure broadcast network while the original PCB algorithm has the highest complexity.
Each of the alternative algorithms uses the same initialization phase as the original and broadcast PCB algorithms.
Hypercube
For simplicity we assume that the group has size n = 2 r . Each group member has an identifier i in the range 0, . . . , n − 1. In a hypercube, two nodes are connected if their identifiers, represented as binary strings, differ in precisely one position. In the hypercube algorithm, during phase k = 0, . . . , r − 1, each group member communicates with the group member whose identifier differs only in the k th position. After all r phases, each node will have sent and received a message from those group members with which it shares an edge of the hypercube. See Fig. 2 .
Hypercube Algorithm -At the iteration step j, a participant M i performs the following operations to generate its share of the distributed key:
For the first set of exchanges in step j, which we call phase k = 0,
where bin(t) is the r-bit binary representation of t and ⊗ is the exclusive-or operation.
Phase 2 of the hypercube algorithm is shown in Fig. 2 .
Once the r phases of the exchange are complete, a participant M i has its combined shares, n l=1 HF K l,j = T K i,j,r−1 . M i then computes the group key and the fresh one-time pad for its computations. M i performs the following operations:
1. Compute the new group key as
Octopus-d
The hypercube algorithm provides substantially lower communication complexity than either the original PCB or the broadcast-enhanced PCB algorithms. Further improvement can be achieved by using an octopus network [BW] . An octopus consists of a d-dimension hypercube connecting a core subset of the group with each core member directly connected to a (2 r −2 d )/2 d sum of its HF K i,j and those of its dependent non-core group members. Core member i computes
Pass Two -Use a modified version of the exchanges of the hypercube algorithm on the core group members of the octopus. In the octopus the values KK i,j,0 are distributed in the first set of exchanges, instead of HF K i,j used by the standard hypercube algorithm. Pass Three -If member i is a core member, then depending on the communication model M i broadcasts:
or M i uses point-to-point messages to exchange E θj−1 (T K i,j,d−1 )
where dependent k (i) is the k th dependent of member i. This phase is shown in Fig. 3 .
Once the exchanges of this iteration are complete, a participant M i has its combined shares, 
Binary Tree
For simplicity we assume that the group has n = 2 r − 1 group members. Each group member has an identifier i in the range 0, . . . , n − 1 and is a node (interior node or leaf node) of a binary tree. The group members are numbered in order of a preorder tree traversal. Group member 0 is the root of the tree, group member 1 is the left sibling of the root, member 2 is the right sibling of the root, and so on.
Binary Tree Algorithm -In the tree algorithm each iteration has two passes. During the first pass each node of the tree (working from the leaf nodes up toward the root) communicates the sum of the Hidden Fraction Key 1. Compute the new group key as
